Buenas Paulo,

Como de costumbre muy interesantes tus comentarios. No obstante los datos que pones en tu post creo que podrían confirmar que la correción todavía no se ha acabado. Creo que para la ultima podriamos tener dos escenarios. Que haya sido la correción mas corta (unicamente tres semanas) o que quizas todavía no haya acabado y dure como mínimo los 1,5 meses de la menor que había hasta ese momento.

¿Que opinas?

Si, es cierto. No sabemos cuando acabará el ajuste. El conteo es hasta la fecha, puede extenderse. Si suponemos que se acabó, tenemos una tendencia de complacencia que en algún momento debe de acabarse. Sigo esperando una corrección de por lo menos 10%. No se si es ahora, o despúes, en cuyo caso pienso que entre más se tarda peor será, ya que se ha creado un exceso de confianza que debe de ser limpiado.
La fortaleza de la semana que recién termina fue un poco inesperada. Y no me gusta mucho para ser negativo. Creo que se se fue un poco de las manos de los bears, esta semana debiera de haber una ataque a la baja sino los bears tendrán que hibernar un tiempo más.

DJIA 10,891.92 -46.90 -0.43%
Nasdaq 2,135.06 -10.26 -0.48%
S&P 500 1,252.30 -5.63 -0.45%
S&P/TSX 11,390.70 -24.82 -0.22%
Bovespa 35,074.63 -363.15 -1.02%

La hiperinflacion del 2006 es peor que la de Weimar Germany en 1923. Hoy no tenemos a Franklin D. Roosvelt, tenemos a Bush, no tenemos al filantropo John D. Rockefeller, tenemos Shutlz y Kissinger.
No somos medio millon de habitantes, somos mas de 6 billones de habitantes que vivimos en 1 solo planeta con los recursos naturales y mas pobreza.
CRISIS FINANCIERA MAS GRANDE QUE LA CAIDA DE WALL STREET EN 1929. http://www.larouchepub.com/spanish/index.html

La pared de dinero: Wall of Money

The nature of Greenspan's dilemma can be seen in the sharp run-up in the markets in the 1997-2000 period, which itself is the result of an attempt to save the system in 1997. In early 1997, British fund manager Tony Dye issued warnings of an imminent disaster in the global derivatives markets, warnings which coincided with reported but downplayed reports of derivatives problems at National Westminster Bank. Dye's warnings echoed those of LaRouche, who had warned since 1993 that derivatives speculation would indeed blow up the system.

In the over-the-counter derivatives markets, it is relatively easy to keep giant derivatives disasters hidden, because no one knows unless the counterparties tell them. Other market participants and the regulators might find out in short order, but the public is rarely told, especially when the problem is serious. Still, actions taken in the wake of a crisis can provide tell-tale signs.

In the case of the derivatives crisis of 1997, the tell-tale sign was the mid-1997 emergence of the so-called "Asian crisis," which was actually a currency-warfare attack on the Asian Tiger economies by Anglo-American financial interests. In typical form, the bankers were attempting to postpone their own bankruptcy by stealing from the Asians. This assault continued into 1998, targetting one Tiger after another, generating billions of dollars in loot and sending funds fleeing to the relative safety of the U.S. financial markets. The result can be seen in the rise of U.S. stock markets during the period.

Greenspan y Soros, con Kissinger: The game came to an abrupt halt in September 1998, when looting-target Russia caught the markets off-guard with a default on its GKO bonds and a devaluation of the ruble. The prospect of a sovereign default—the "debt bomb" policy advocated by LaRouche—sent the financial markets into panic, with investors fleeing speculative paper in favor of more secure U.S. and German government bonds. This, in turn, caused many derivatives speculators to hemorrhage money, with the markets moving in the opposite direction from their bets. Long-Term Capital Management, the giant Nobel Laureate hedge fund, went bankrupt and was bailed out by the banks at the urging of the Fed. Many other derivatives players, some considerably bigger than LTCM, were also grievously wounded.

In response, Greenspan and his central banking peers launched what speculator George Soros later called the "wall of money," flooding the markets with liquidity and promises, and a cover-up of the extent of the damage. Only later would the players admit what LaRouche said at the time: that the global financial system came within a hair of melting down in 1998.